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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
-----------------------------------------------------X
In the Matter of the Application of
DWIGHT JAMES,#84-A-7255,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #44-1-2011-0409.21
INDEX #136245
ORI # NY044015J

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD
OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the petition of Dwight James, verified on May 23, 2011 and filed in the St.
Lawrence County Clerk’s office on May 31, 2011. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Riverview Correctional Facility, is challenging the September 2010 determination denying
him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued
an Order to Show Cause on June 3, 2011 and has received and reviewed respondent’s
Answer/Return, including confidential Exhibits D and C, verified on July 14, 2011. The
Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto, filed in the St. Lawrence
County Clerk’s office on July 21, 2011.
On November 14, 1984 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 2 to 4 years upon his
conviction of the crime of Robbery 3°. The criminal offense underlying petitioner’s 1984
conviction was committed on October 11, 1983. On November 6, 1985, petitioner was
sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County, as a second felony offender, to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life upon his convictions of the crimes
of Murder 2°, Robbery 1° and Robbery 2°. The criminal offenses underlying petitioner’s
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1985 convictions were committed on January 23, 1984, apparently while petitioner was
out on bail from the charges associated with his 1984 conviction.
After having been denied discretionary parole release on one previous occasion,
petitioner made his second appearance before a Parole Board, by teleconference, on
September 14, 2010. Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying
petitioner parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. Both
parole commissioners concurred in the denial determination which reads as follows:
“After review of the record and interview the Panel has determined
if released at this time your release would be incompatible with the welfare
of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to
undermine respect for the law. This decision is based on the following
factors:
Your instant offenses are murder second degree, robbery first degree,
robbery second degree and robbery third degree, your crimes involve you
shooting and killing a victim in a supermarket during the course of a
robbery. You were also involved in a prior robbery. These crimes are a
severe escalation and continuation of a criminal history that includes theft
related convictions and you were undeterred by prior court intervention
and leniencies. The Board notes your improved discipline and well
prepared personal parole summary, which outlines your numerous
accomplishments and letters of support. All factors considered, however,
your release at this time is not appropriate. More compelling is the
senseless loss of life of an innocent victim and the extreme violence
exhibited in the instant offenses.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal was received by the Division
of Parole Appeals Unit on December 1, 2010. The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue
its findings and recommendation within the four-month time frame specified in 9 NYCRR
§8006.4(c). This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
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will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where, as here, the minimum period of
imprisonment was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense (with “due consideration” to, among other things,
the “recommendations of the sentencing court . . .” ) as well as the inmate’s prior criminal
record. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).1
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner first asserts that the Inmate Status Report (ISR)prepared in anticipation
of his September 14, 2010 Parole Board appearance repeats erroneous information

1

The quoted excerpts, from Executive Law §§259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-i(1)(a) are taken from those
statutes as they existed at the time of the September 2010 parole denial determination. Executive Law §259i(1) was repealed and Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A,§§38-f
and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011. The amendments to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) include the
incorporation of relevant language from repealed Executive Law §259-i(1)(a).
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originally set forth in the pre-sentence investigation report. In describing the events
leading up to the criminal acts underlying petitioner’s 1985 convictions, it is stated on
page two of the ISR (under the heading “PRESENT OFFENSE: INDICT #3071-84") that
“[o]n 1-23-84 [co-defendant] Sergio Parrilla met [petitioner] Dwight James on the street,
who was talking with [co-defendants] Steven Rogers and James Reed, also know as ‘his
group.’ Parrilla noticed that James, Rogers and Reed had guns. James asked Parrilla and
the other two men if they wanted to partake in a robbery of a delicatessen.” Citing the
trial testimony of his various co-defendants, however, petitioner asserts that the ISR
erroneously ascribes a leadership role in the criminal undertaking to him, rather than codefendant James Reed.
When an individual is convicted of a felony the trial court is generally required to
order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant and sentence may not be pronounced
until the court has received a written report of the investigation. See CPL §390.20(1).
“The pre-sentence investigation consists of the gathering of information with respect to
the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, the defendant’s history of
delinquency or criminality, and the defendant’s social history, employment history, family
situation, economic status, education, and personal habits. Such investigation may also
include any other matter which the agency conducting the investigation deems relevant
to the question of sentence, and must include any matter the court directs to be included.”
CPL §390.30(1) (emphasis added).

Due process considerations require that the

sentencing court must assure itself that the information forming the basis of the sentence
imposed is reliable and accurate. See People v. Outley, 80 NY2d 702. CPL §390.40(1)
specifically authorizes a criminal defendant to file a written memorandum with the court,
at any time prior to sentencing, setting forth such information as the defendant deems
pertinent to his or her sentencing, including information with respect any of the matters
set forth in CPL §390.30. The Criminal Procedure Law also authorizes the court to
conduct a pre-sentence conference for the purpose of resolving “. . . discrepancies between
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the pre-sentence report, or other information that the court has received, and the
defendant’s . . . pre-sentence memorandum . . .” CPL §400.10(1). Thus, there is
established in the Criminal Procedure Law a mechanism by which the petitioner could
have challenged the accuracy of any information contained in the pre-sentence report.
There is no allegation that petitioner availed himself of that opportunity. Instead, he
seeks, in effect, to collaterally challenge the accuracy of the pre-sentence investigation,
more than a quarter of a century after the fact, in this proceeding. The Court, however,
finds petitioner’s challenge untimely in that it should have been addressed to the
sentencing court prior to sentencing. See Hughes v. New York City Department of
Probation, 281 AD2d 229, Sciaraffo v. New York City Department of Probation, 248
AD2d 477 and Salahuddin v. Mitchell, 232 AD2d 903.
To the extent petitioner asserts that the allegedly erroneous information set forth
in the ISR was simply copied from the pre-sentence investigation, the Court notes that on
the lower portion of page two of the ISR (under the heading “INMATE’S STATEMENT”)
petitioner is reported to have said “ . . .that James Reed was the main person in the
robbery, and that he had the guns. The subject [petitioner] also added that the phrase,
‘his group,’ in the write-up of the present offense refers to James Reed and not the
subject.” In any event, the Court finds nothing in the record to indicate that the alleged
erroneous information regarding petitioner’s leadership role in the criminal acts
underlying his 1985 convictions served as a basis for the parole denial determination. See
Restivo v. New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD3d 1096.
Citing Executive Law §259-i(1)(a) petitioner next asserts that the parole denial
determination was fatally flawed by reason of the Board’s failure to obtain a copy of the
1985 sentencing minutes and the resulting failure of the Board to consider the
recommendations of the sentencing court. According to petitioner, he “vividly” recalled
that the 1985 sentencing court “ . . .made statements relevant to the crime, the sentence
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and parole concerns during sentencing, which could impact the Board of Parole’s
considerations and final determination.”
It is not disputed that the Parole Board considering petitioner for discretionary
release did not have before it a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes. The respondent
asserts, however, that unsuccessful efforts were made to secure a copy of such minutes
from the sentencing court. In support of this assertion the respondent annexed to its
answer as Exhibit G copies of multiple requests to the sentencing court for the production
of the sentencing minutes, dated May 27, 2008, February 2, 2010 and May 19, 2010,
together with correspondence from a representative of the sentencing court, dated
June 23, 2011 and June 24, 2011, stating that “[a] diligent effort was made to locate the
stenographic notes. Unfortunately we have been unsuccessful in finding these notes, and
we are unable to provide the requested minutes.”
A Parole Board considering a DOCCS inmate for discretionary release is clearly
required to take into account any parole recommendation of the sentencing judge and is
therefore ordinarily required to have before it a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes.
See Standley v. New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169 and McLaurin v. New
York State Board of Parole, 27 AD3d 565. Notwithstanding the foregoing, however,
where, as here, the failure of a Parole Board to consider the relevant sentencing minutes
is the result of a documented inability on the part of the sentencing court to provide a
copy of the minutes, such failure does not render a parole denial determination irrational
to the point of impropriety. See Geraci v. Evans, 76 AD3d 1161, Blasich v. New York
State Board of Parole, 68 AD3d 1339 and Freeman v. Alexander, 65 AD3d 1429.
The remainder of the petition is focused, in one way or another, upon the assertion
that the Parole Board failed to give adequate consideration to statutory factors other than
the nature/circumstances of the crimes underlying petitioner’s current incarceration and
his criminal history. A Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each
statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole
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determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written
decision. See Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v.
Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v. Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As
noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole
denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the
relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the
record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not
required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole
as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division
of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
A review of the ISR and the transcript of the parole hearing reveals that the Board
had before it, and considered, the appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s
programming, vocational and academic achievements, “improved” disciplinary record,
release plans, family support, as well as the circumstances of the crime underlying his
incarceration and prior criminal record. See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. During the
course of the September 14, 2010 Board appearance, moreover, petitioner was specifically
afforded an opportunity to discuss “ . . .anything in particular in your parole packet that
you want to point out that you are particularly proud of or want to highlight for our
attention.” In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole
Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State
Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.
Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration and his prior criminal history. See
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Veras v. New York State Division of Parole, 56 AD3d 878, Serrano v. Dennison, 46 AD3d
1002, Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45 AD3d 1086 and Farid v. Travis,
17 AD3d 754, app dis 5 NY3d 782. The Court notes, moreover, that the Parole Board’s
reference to petitioner’s “improved discipline” can be viewed as constituting double-edged
praise. The Board indeed found it noteworthy that petitioner had committed no
disciplinary infractions in the 28 months leading up to his September 14, 2010
appearance. Petitioner, citing Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470 at 477, in paragraph 28 of
his petition, characterized this development as “. . . exemplifying the ‘strong rehabilitative
component’ underlying the statutory scheme inherent in an indeterminate sentencing
structure.” A review of the Inmate Disciplinary History printout, annexed to respondent’s
Answer/Return as part of Exhibit A, however, reveals 10 Tier III infractions and 29 II
infractions between August 30, 1989 and May 9, 2008. When petitioner was denied
discretionary parole release following his first Parole Board appearance in September of
2008 the Board found that petitioner had “ . . .demonstrated a propensity for neglect and
out-of-control behavior leading to ongoing sanctions.

You [petitioner] have not

demonstrated an ability to abide by the rules, therefore, positive-re-entry is unlikely at
this time.” Although petitioner’s clean disciplinary record in the 28 months leading up
to his September 14, 2010 Board re-appearance is obviously significant, it is certainly not
illogical to view that factor as somewhat less compelling than if such record spanned a
substantially broader portion of petitioner’s overall period of incarceration.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

September 15, 2011 at
Indian Lake, New York

___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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